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OPINION  
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 This putative class action alleges that the Delaware 
correctional system routinely fails to release inmates in a 
timely manner, holding them for days or weeks beyond when 
they should be set free.  Appellants, a group of inmates who 
were over-detained, have sued top correctional officials—
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specifically, former Delaware Department of Corrections 
(“DDOC”) Commissioner Carl Danberg, current DDOC 
Commissioner Robert Coupe,1 and Rebecca McBride, the 
current Director of the DDOC Central Offender Records 
division (“COR”)—seeking both damages and structural 
reform of COR.  The District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Danberg, McBride, and Coupe 
(Appellees).  We will affirm.   
I. FACTS 
 In 2008, the Delaware correctional system was facing 
scandal for its handling of inmate releases.  One inmate, 
Jermaine Lamar Wilson, committed suicide in his cell on the 
day he was supposed to be—but was not—released.2  Dozens 
of other inmates had either been released too early or too late.  
National experts, cited in contemporaneous press reports, 
expressed surprise about how many Delaware inmates were 
improperly released.  As gubernatorial candidates from both 
parties attacked the state correctional system, there was high-
level support for reform. 
 That reform took shape in the establishment of a new 
Central Offender Records office within the Delaware 
Department of Corrections.  Previously, staff at each prison 
handled releases individually.  COR was meant to centralize, 
                                                 
1 The District Court allowed the substitution of Coupe for 
Danberg as a defendant for purposes of prospective relief 
only.   
2 Wilson v. Taylor, 597 F. Supp. 2d 451, 457-58 (D. Del. 
2009).   
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standardize, and generally improve the state’s processing of 
inmate releases.  The creation of COR, led by then-DDOC 
Commissioner Carl Danberg, was a substantial bureaucratic 
undertaking, requiring the department to coordinate with 
legislators, the judiciary, and its unionized employees. 
 This litigation, however, contests whether 
centralization has brought improvement.  Appellants allege 
that Delaware’s problems with over-detentions have, if 
anything, gotten worse since 2008.   
 Under the new system, after an inmate is ordered to be 
released (because he or she posted bail, because their bail was 
changed from secured to unsecured, or because they 
completed their sentence, to offer a few examples), the court 
is supposed to fax an order to COR.  COR then checks 
whether there is a reason to continue holding the individual—
for example, an outstanding warrant—and if there is not, 
sends instructions to the facility where they are being held for 
that individual’s release. 
 Undoubtedly, there were bumps along the way to a 
centralized system.  In 2008, Danberg himself admitted that 
the creation of COR had caused confusion during the 
transition itself.  Led by Appellees, DDOC has attempted to 
improve COR’s functioning since its inception.  COR has an 
official goal of processing all releases within 24 hours.  
Observing delays in the processing of releases, Appellees 
have increased staffing levels.  They created a new six-month 
orientation period for new hires at COR.  In 2010, COR 
adopted a new computer system, called the Delaware 
Automated Correction System (“DACS”) which is meant to 
foster better tracking of release dates and the “triage” of 
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records to prioritize releases.3  JA 15.  Finally, COR created a 
new priority unit for releases likely to be fast and easy, such 
as those whose bail is changed to unsecured or those whose 
charges are dismissed.  According to McBride, she and her 
co-defendants are “always looking at ways to be more 
efficient.”  JA 12.  
 Even with these interventions, however, Appellants 
suggest that COR is badly broken, causing or allowing the 
over-detention of as many as thousands of inmates a year.4  
To support their theory of over-detention, Appellants 
submitted a disparate and somewhat disjointed assortment of 
affidavits from several witnesses whose work brings them in 
close contact with the correctional system.  These affidavits, 
described below, reported huge numbers of over-detentions, 
albeit in an impressionistic fashion based on the affiants’ own 
personal observations and estimates.   
 First, a former records clerk at COR named Brenda 
Bell5 estimated that 10 to 20 percent of release orders 
                                                 
3 One COR employee, however, averred that the new 
computer system “caused more delays.”  JA 163. 
4 The parties dispute in the briefing exactly how “over-
detention” should be defined and in particular whether over-
detentions of a certain length of time should qualify.  This 
issue is not material to this appeal.  
5 Bell worked at COR for roughly one year between 2011 and 
2012.  She worked as a Records Clerk and Records Specialist 
during her employment, positions that involved work on 
release orders. 
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received by COR were not processed and sent to a 
correctional facility within 24 hours, and that 20 to 30 
inmates per week ended up spending more than two days 
waiting for COR to send their release order to their facility. 
 Second, a bail bondsperson, Bruny Mercado,6 
calculated that about 35 percent of people for whom she had 
posted bond were held for more than 24 hours after bond was 
posted, and 25 percent of people were held for more than 48 
hours afterward.  Mercado also said that she had seen no 
improvement at COR in its four years of existence.   
 Third, a Delaware public defender, Sandra Dean,7 
averred that over-detention was a “consistent problem” for 
her clients.  JA 179.  She reported that she had her secretary 
call COR every day to inquire about clients whose release had 
been ordered by the courts and that she followed up 
personally with COR for clients who were not released after 
three days.  Notably, although Dean only served as a public 
defender until 2010, she claimed that the over-detention 
problem worsened at the end of that period.   
                                                 
6 Mercado has owned and operated her own bail bond 
company since 2002 and posts bail for approximately 25 to 
30 people in Delaware per month.  She and her employees 
observe the release process after they post bond for their 
clients and communicate with COR during that process. 
7 Dean worked as an attorney for the Delaware Office of the 
Public Defender from 1991 to 2010.  When her clients were 
over-detained, she worked to secure their release.   
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 Given that COR processes between 16,000 and 18,000 
releases per year, these affidavits allege as many as 6,300 
over-detentions a year.  The affidavits also allege that COR 
was informed of the problem, both by Dean’s regular 
inquiries and by Mercado, who stated that she had spoken 
personally with McBride about the over-detention problems. 
 On the other hand, hard, reliable data about the number 
of over-detentions occurring each year is more or less missing 
from the record.  Appellants’ affidavits put forth various 
estimates of the over-detention problem, but no precise 
quantification or authoritative analysis.  They offer a limited 
ability to understand how the problem has changed over time.   
 In contrast, Appellees do not even attempt to provide a 
systematic accounting of over-detentions from their own 
archives.  Rather, they base their count of over-detentions on 
Appellants’ ability to identify specific over-detained inmates. 
 The record does include various tables purporting to 
show the number of over-detentions each month, which 
totaled to two each year of the relevant period except for FY 
’10, when there were 18 over-detentions.  But neither party 
treats those tables as reliable.  Given the absence of 
information about the source of that data, we likewise decline 
to treat these tables as reliable.8 
                                                 
8 At oral argument, Appellants claimed that those tables count 
only the over-detentions specifically brought to McBride’s 
attention.  This is not evident from the record, but if it were 
so, that would not provide any reliable metric for the actual 
number of over-detentions.   
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 According to Appellants, two specific problems at 
COR, in addition to the general failure of the centralization 
effort, account for the continuing trouble with over-
detentions.  First, they claim that COR is under-staffed 
generally and particularly short-handed on nights and 
weekends.  COR employees and former employees testified 
that the division would be able to process releases more 
quickly and avoid over-detentions if it had more staff or was 
open more hours.  Coverage is worse on weekends: although 
fewer releases arrive at COR on weekends, staffing levels are 
more-than-proportionally thinner.  COR also typically closes 
its offices between 10:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. and over 
holidays, which Appellants allege leads to worse delays 
during those periods (Delaware’s Justice of the Peace Courts, 
which send releases to COR, remain open 24/7).  During 
those periods, however, COR supervisors are on call around 
the clock to handle any problems that might arise.  Appellee 
McBride testified that she has never received any complaints 
about coverage while COR offices were closed, and there is 
no record evidence that over-detentions cluster around 
holidays or are otherwise affected by these closures.  
 Second, Appellants argue that COR is unresponsive to 
inmates and those acting on their behalf.  Prisoners cannot 
contact COR directly, except by mail.  If they want more 
immediate communication with COR—and time is of the 
essence for an inmate detained past his release date—they 
must request that prison staff email COR.  Prisoners’ families, 
friends, and bail bondsmen can call COR directly, but 
generally complain that COR is frequently unhelpful or 
indifferent, when it can be reached at all.  Outside input 
allegedly falls on deaf ears.  But inmates and their associates 
are the individuals best placed to know that they have been 
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over-detained—they have access to information and strong 
incentives to monitor COR—and could play an important 
oversight function if allowed.   
 Indeed, the record shows that when inquiries did reach 
COR, they helped spur COR to fix problems.  Sandra Dean, 
the public defender, noted her practice of routinely contacting 
COR about over-detained clients.  She stated that additional 
pressure, such as threatening to contact a judge or initiate a 
contempt proceeding, helped more.  Conversely, Dean 
observed that those least able to speak for themselves when 
over-detained, like the handicapped or those who did not 
speak English, were at greater risk.  Likewise, after 
Appellants complained of being over-detained, prison 
officials urged them to contact COR because that was the best 
way to speed their release.  COR’s alleged failure to 
communicate potentially deprives COR of an alert system and 
allows errors to fester.  That said, McBride testified that 
family members, courts, and correctional officers are able to 
reach her directly with complaints about over-detention and 
that she responds to those complaints with an immediate 
investigation into the inmate’s situation. 
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 Plaintiffs filed their complaint on October 1, 2012.  At 
the close of discovery, Plaintiffs moved for class certification 
and Defendants for summary judgment.   
 The District Court’s opinion denied the motion for 
class certification and granted summary judgment.  
Defendants prevailed in toto.  Class certification was denied 
on commonality grounds because some members of the 
proposed class were over-detained due to delays in the court 
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system, rather than delays at COR.  The Court found that 
there was no “common contention” the truth of which could 
“resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of 
the claims in one stroke.”  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 
564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011).  The Court also found that all 
claims against Defendants in their official capacities were 
barred by sovereign immunity; it declined to reach the 
question of qualified immunity; and it granted summary 
judgment on Appellants’ state law claims.   
 The Court framed its analysis of the core federal 
constitutional claims by using the “more-specific-provision 
rule.”  Specifically, the Court determined that the rule meant 
that any substantive due process claims should be addressed 
only under the more specific Eighth Amendment analysis of 
cruel and unusual punishment.  See Betts v. New Castle Youth 
Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 261 (3d Cir. 2010).  In that Eighth 
Amendment analysis, the District Court held that Plaintiffs 
failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact on 
two required elements of their claim—deliberate indifference 
by Defendants to the risk of over-detentions and a causal 
connection between Defendants’ acts and Plaintiffs’ over-
detentions.   
 In this respect, the Court found particularly 
determinative: 1) press coverage praising defendant Danberg 
for his creation of COR and his efforts to fix the over-
detention problem, 2) defendant McBride’s familiarity with 
COR procedures and her work to improve them, and 3) 
defendant Coupe’s formation of a special unit to speed up 
daily bail releases.   
 Plaintiffs filed a Rule 59(e) motion to amend the 
judgment, which was denied because Plaintiffs simply 
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rehashed the arguments posed on summary judgment.  
Plaintiffs then appealed all of the federal claims asserted. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW9 
 On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the 
Court of Appeals’ review is “plenary” and the court should 
“apply the same test the district court should have utilized 
initially.”  Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(citation omitted).  Summary judgment should be granted 
only when the record shows that “there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  “[A]ll 
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [the nonmovant’s] 
favor” but the “mere existence of some evidence in support of 
the nonmovant is insufficient to deny a motion for summary 
judgment; enough evidence must exist to enable a jury to 
reasonably find for the nonmovant on the issue.”  Giles, 571 
F.3d at 322 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 249, 255 (1986)).   
 In deciding whether to certify a class under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a district court must make 
“findings” and factual determinations.  In re Hydrogen 
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 320 (3d Cir. 2008).  
The burden of proof rests with the movant to “affirmatively 
                                                 
9 The District Court had jurisdiction over this civil rights 
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 and exercised 
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1367.  The District Court’s summary judgment 
constituted a final decision and this Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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demonstrate” certifiability by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350.  The District Court’s 
denial of class certification is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 165 (3d Cir. 2001).   
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Eighth Amendment Legal Standards 
 Our standard for analyzing over-detention claims is 
well-established.  An inmate’s detention after his term of 
imprisonment can, under certain circumstances, constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.  Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243, 250 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  Continued incarceration beyond that point is 
clearly punitive, and in many cases will serve no penological 
justification at all.  Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1108 
(3d Cir. 1989).  That said, we also recognize that “[t]he 
administration of a system of punishment entails an 
unavoidable risk of error” and that “[e]limination of the risk 
of error in many instances would be either literally impossible 
or unfeasible because prohibitively costly.”  Id.  The Eighth 
Amendment does not, and could not, require the elimination 
of all such risk of error.   
 Thus, we have established a three-part test for over-
detention claims.  A plaintiff must show:  
(1) a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner’s 
problem and thus of the risk that unwarranted 
punishment was being, or would be, inflicted; (2) the 
official either failed to act or took only ineffectual 
action under the circumstances, indicating that his 
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response to the problem was a product of deliberate 
indifference to the prisoner’s plight; and (3) a causal 
connection between the official’s response to the 
problem and the unjustified detention.”   
Montanez, 603 F.3d at 252.10 
                                                 
10 Our precedent also describes the test for supervisor liability 
under the Eighth Amendment as a four-part test: “the plaintiff 
must identify a specific policy or practice that the supervisor 
failed to employ and show that: (1) the existing policy or 
practice created an unreasonable risk of the Eighth 
Amendment injury; (2) the supervisor was aware that the 
unreasonable risk was created; (3) the supervisor was 
indifferent to that risk; and (4) the injury resulted from the 
policy or practice.”  Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 
134 (3d Cir. 2001).  But see Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 
766 F.3d 307, 341 (3d Cir. 2014) (Hardiman, J., dissenting), 
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 
2042 (2015) (questioning validity of four-part test).  For 
purposes of this litigation, the two formulations of the Eighth 
Amendment standard are functionally equivalent, each 
broadly requiring risk, knowledge, deliberate indifference and 
causation.  We find the over-detention-specific description of 
our standard better structures our analysis in this case.  In any 
event, because Plaintiffs fail to show deliberate indifference, 
as explained herein, they could not survive summary 
judgment under either standard.  
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 Up to now, our over-detention jurisprudence has 
concerned individual plaintiffs challenging decisions specific 
to themselves.  In Sample v. Diecks, our first decision in this 
line of cases, a prison records officer mistakenly determined 
that an inmate still had time to serve on another sentence and 
authorities therefore refused to release him.  885 F.2d at 1102.  
Then came Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993), 
which concerned parole officers who initially misinterpreted a 
judge’s sentencing order, resulting in a six-month delay in the 
inmate’s release while officials conducted an investigation.  
Most recently, Montanez v. Thompson likewise involved 
various calculations of a particular inmate’s sentence.  603 
F.3d at 246-48. 
 In contrast, Plaintiffs here allege systemic 
shortcomings at COR.  The problems are not prisoner-specific 
misapplications of the law, but organizational policies and 
practices.  Nevertheless, the same standard applies, although 
it must be applied with sensitivity to the change of context.  
In particular, we have noted that the position of the defendant 
in an over-detention suit must affect the second prong of our 
test: deliberate indifference. “Among the circumstances 
relevant to a determination of whether the requisite attitude 
was present are the scope of the official’s duties and the role 
he or she has played in the everyday life of the prison.”  
Sample, 885 F.2d at 1110.  An official is less likely to display 
deliberate indifference if “there are procedures in place 
calling for others to pursue the matter” and more likely to be 
deliberately indifferent if given his or her role, a problem 
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“will not likely be resolved unless he or she addresses it or 
refers it to others[.]”  Id.11   
 This flexible standard for deliberate indifference, 
which foresees suits against officials up and down the 
organizational chart of the prison system, anticipates that 
over-detention claims may raise structural challenges as well 
as individual ones.  Indeed, this is the necessary corollary of 
our recognition that the “administration of a system of 
punishment entails an unavoidable risk of error.”  Sample, 
885 F.2d at 1108.  Operating a prison system is a major 
bureaucratic undertaking.  That fact compels us to offer 
individual prison officials room for imperfection and 
accidents.  But it also teaches that preventing over-detentions 
may require bureaucratic solutions from top management.  
Litigation against top administrators, seeking structural 
reforms of the agency as a whole, may be the only effective 
way to reduce the overall risk of unconstitutional error.  
Where appropriate, we must treat the correctional system as a 
system. 
 Suits against high-level government officials must 
satisfy the general requirements for supervisory liability.  In 
                                                 
11 Here, Appellees are the officials tasked with resolving the 
alleged problems.  Appellants allege that structural features of 
COR cause a systemic over-detention problem.  Only top 
administrators, not line staff processing individual releases, 
can increase staffing levels, foster a more open culture of 
communication or declare the creation of COR a success or 
failure.  The problems alleged in this litigation “will not likely 
be resolved unless” top administrators like Appellees address 
them.  Sample, 885 F.2d at 1110.   
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particular, supervisors are liable only for their own acts; in 
this case, they are liable only if they, “with deliberate 
indifference to the consequences, established and maintained 
a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] 
constitutional harm.”  A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. 
Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting 
Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d 
Cir. 1989)) (alteration in original).  This standard for 
supervisory liability largely overlaps with the over-detention 
standard—both require a showing of deliberate indifference 
and causation—but centers the inquiry around a policy or 
practice.    
B. Eighth Amendment Analysis 
 We agree with the District Court that Appellants 
established a genuine dispute of material fact as to the first 
prong of the over-detention standard: knowledge of a risk of 
unwarranted punishment.  Fundamentally, COR was created 
because DDOC was aware of what it believed to be an 
unacceptable level of over-detention in Delaware.12  
Moreover, there is record evidence that those near to the 
correctional system warned Appellees of continuing over-
detention problems post-2008, including the public defender, 
Sandra Dean, and the bail bondsperson, Bruny Mercado.  
While the record does not allow for the exact calculation of 
over-detention levels or year-by-year trends in over-detention, 
a jury could reasonably find the overall level of over-
detention to be quite substantial.  Indeed, McBride’s own 
                                                 
12 Whether the pre-2008 system in fact failed to meet 
constitutional standards is outside of our purview in this 
matter. 
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testimony shows an awareness of continuing challenges at 
COR:  She admitted at her deposition that she has always 
perceived a problem with the timely processing of releases, 
since the creation of COR.  Her efforts to improve COR came 
in response to a sense that there was a need for change in the 
agency’s operations.   
 Appellants fail, however, to show a genuine dispute of 
material fact as to the second prong: deliberate indifference.  
As the District Court held, the record shows a variety of 
efforts by Appellees to improve COR and address the over-
detention problem.  For example, not only did McBride 
increase staffing levels at COR, she offered uncontradicted 
testimony that she did so specifically in response to delays in 
processing.  Likewise, her efforts to improve the agency’s 
training system, to upgrade its technology, and to create 
special units to more efficiently handle certain types of 
release show, as she testified, that COR leadership was 
“always looking at ways to be more efficient.”  JA 12.   
 These facts weigh heavily against any reasonable 
finding of deliberate indifference.  In Moore v. Tartler, we 
observed that deliberate indifference had been “demonstrated 
in those cases where prison officials were put on notice and 
then simply refused to investigate a prisoner’s claim of 
sentence miscalculation.”  986 F.2d at 686 (citing Alexander 
v. Perrill, 916 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir. 1990) and Haygood 
v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1985)).  Because the 
parole board officials’ investigation in Moore constituted 
“affirmative steps” to resolve the issue, we could not find 
deliberate indifference.  Id. at 687.  Here, Appellees have also 
taken affirmative steps to address over-detentions in the 
Delaware system and this makes a finding of deliberate 
indifference difficult. 
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 But the presence of such affirmative steps is not 
necessarily dispositive.  A further inquiry, not undertaken by 
the District Court, is required in this case.  In Moore, the 
parole officers’ investigation was targeted to resolve the 
inmate’s complaint in full.  Although the investigation was 
slow, the officials could safely conclude that upon its 
completion they would have done all that they could do to 
address Moore’s over-detention.  Here, it is not self-evident 
that the COR reforms were up to the task at hand.  
“[I]neffectual action under the circumstances” can also 
indicate deliberate indifference.  Montanez, 603 F.3d at 252.   
 This is not to say that federal courts conduct 
independent reviews of the wisdom of prison policy.  The 
purpose of addressing “ineffectual action” is not to render a 
program evaluation.  The ultimate subject of inquiry remains 
deliberate indifference: a state of mind.  We look to see 
whether the gap between the officials’ actions or inaction and 
the problem they were trying to solve was so large that those 
actions display deliberate indifference.  Imagine an inmate 
who came to the prison infirmary with a cut and with kidney 
failure and was given only a bandage.  We would have no 
trouble concluding that this could constitute deliberate 
indifference.  Cf. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 194-95, 
198-99 (3d Cir. 1999) (suggesting that providing diabetic 
inmates with only one insulin injection per day and less-than-
daily blood sugar monitoring, when they needed more, can 
constitute deliberate indifference).   
 By the same token, supervisory efforts to minimize 
over-detentions in one manner could, in principle, co-exist 
with deliberate indifference to a festering over-detention 
problem rooted in different agency practices or policies.  
Given the allegations of rampant over-detention—affecting as 
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many as one-third of inmates—a jury could might reasonably 
ponder whether something along these lines was occurring.    
  But an argument of this sort requires evidence to 
survive summary judgment.  While Appellants may have 
shown a genuine dispute whether over-detentions remain a 
large-scale problem in the Delaware correctional system, 
there is no genuine dispute regarding whether Appellees have 
tried to address the over-detention problem.  Viewing the 
facts in the light most favorable to Appellants, we could 
conclude that over-detentions are rampant in Delaware and 
that correctional officials are trying, albeit without great 
success, to tackle that challenge.  So far, this is not deliberate 
indifference.  Appellants need more to rescue their claim.  
They would need to show that Appellees’ efforts to improve 
COR so obviously miss the mark that pursuing those efforts 
manifests disregard for the real problem and thereby amounts 
to deliberate indifference.  Such evidence is absent from the 
record. 
 On summary judgment, the nonmoving party must 
affirmatively “show where in the record there exists a genuine 
dispute over a material fact.”  Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 
480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007).  “[S]peculation and 
conjecture may not defeat a motion for summary judgment[.]”  
Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 
228 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Lexington Ins. Co. v. W. Pa. Hosp., 
423 F.3d 318, 332-33 (3d Cir. 2005)).  But speculation is all 
that Appellants can put forward to show that the DDOC 
officials were deliberately indifferent notwithstanding their 
efforts to improve the release process.  The record offers no 
reason to believe that Appellees’ chosen interventions were 
callously misguided.   
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 For example, Appellants offer an affidavit from a 
former COR employee stating that the computerized DACS 
system increased delay.  Whether DACS was a successful 
technological upgrade is not a dispute sufficient to go to trial.  
It does not show a dispute that computerization was 
misguided from the start.  Moreover, McBride testified that 
DACS has helped COR be more efficient and has sped up the 
release process.  She admitted that there were issues with the 
system that needed to be resolved, but did not indicate that 
COR would leave those issues unaddressed.  DACS may have 
been “ineffective” in the sense that it did not immediately 
reduce over-detentions—but that is not the test.  Rather, 
Appellants must show that COR’s ineffectiveness amounted 
to deliberate indifference.   
 Likewise, it may be the case that COR needs more 
staff.  There is evidence to that effect, sufficient to create a 
factual dispute.  But the record also shows that McBride 
observed a need for more staff, worked with other officials to 
calculate how many more staff were required, and secured 
those positions from more senior authorities within state 
government.  Separately, COR also increased the number of 
casual/seasonal staff used to pull and re-file records, again in 
response to a perceived need and a review of agency 
operations.  To show deliberate indifference on the staffing 
issue, Appellants would need evidence that would allow a 
jury to conclude, for example, that COR knew its staffing 
increases would be insufficient or that after it realized it still 
needed more staff after the first round of hires, it did nothing 
in response.  No such evidence is in this record.  
 With regards to COR’s unresponsiveness to outside 
communications, a different sort of evidence would be needed 
to establish deliberate indifference.  Appellants demonstrated 
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a dispute whether COR was open to inquiries from inmates 
and whether increased openness would help reduce over-
detentions.  As already noted, there is evidence to suggest that 
inmates were urged to contact COR to expedite their release 
and that where contact was made, such as by a public 
defender, it really did spur action.  But the record does not 
show that COR took any particular action to improve this 
problem.  Although this may be more indicative of deliberate 
indifference, what is absent here is any evidence showing that 
COR should have addressed this problem with particular 
alacrity as opposed to any other.  Had the crux of the 
evidence presented to the District Court been that closed 
channels of communication caused particularly large numbers 
of over-detentions; that an alternative system had been 
presented to COR or was a best practice they should have 
known to adopt; or that changes to COR’s communications 
policy would have been easier or more efficacious than 
COR’s other reform efforts, then Appellants may have been 
in a different posture regarding summary judgment.13 
 Nor could a reasonable jury infer deliberate 
indifference from the simple fact that over-detentions 
increased in this period (if the jury found that they did).  
There are surely many variables that affect the over-detention 
                                                 
13 Even less indicative of deliberate indifference is 
Appellants’ assertion that COR failed to track certain 
performance metrics, such as the number of lost files or the 
number of inmate letters received.  No record evidence is put 
forward that could allow a finding that these metrics should 
have been used rather than the alternative forms of tracking 
and oversight employed at COR, much less that Appellees 
were deliberately indifferent for failing to use them. 
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problem.  In particular, there is substantial and uncontested 
record evidence that many over-detentions originate in the 
court system rather than at COR.  It is entirely plausible that 
the overall increase in over-detentions stemmed from changes 
outside COR and that the reform efforts at COR, though 
effective, were swamped by external forces.  To survive 
summary judgment, Appellants need more than speculation 
connecting any increase in over-detentions with the COR 
policies they deem ineffective.    
 A comparison with a similar, successful over-detention 
suit is instructive.  In Barnes v. District of Columbia, 793 F. 
Supp. 2d 260 (D.D.C. 2011), the Court was presented with a 
far richer evidentiary picture—and plaintiffs were able not 
only to avoid summary judgment, but to win summary 
judgment themselves on certain of their claims.  There, as 
here, the correctional officials had made efforts to reduce 
over-detentions and there, as here, plaintiffs argued that those 
efforts were ineffectual.  But plaintiffs were able to carry their 
burden.  They hired a statistical expert to sift through 
correctional records and provide reliable annual estimates of 
how many people had been over-detained.  Id. at 269-70.  
What is more, they were able to estimate how many of those 
over-detentions were attributable to specific policies.  Id. at 
271.  This allowed the Court to determine that the District of 
Columbia’s early efforts to reduce over-detentions were 
utterly ineffectual, allowing a grant of summary judgment for 
plaintiffs, and that the District’s later efforts were quite 
effective, allowing a grant of summary judgment for 
defendants (whether the District’s efforts during an 
intermediate period showed deliberate indifference required 
factfinding).  Id. at 280-81.  Plaintiffs in Barnes could also 
demonstrate precisely how long processing a release should 
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take and how much longer it often took in practice.  Id. at 
278-79.  This sort of data allowed plaintiffs to show 
deliberate indifference to over-detentions, even in the face of 
affirmative steps to improve matters.  Appellants have not 
shown deliberate indifference here.  We therefore affirm the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment for Appellees on 
all Eighth Amendment claims.   
C. Fourteenth Amendment Analysis  
 For the same reasons, we affirm the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment on all Fourteenth Amendment 
substantive due process claims.  The District Court dismissed 
Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims under the “more-
specific-provision rule.”  That rule holds that “if a 
constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional 
provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the 
claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that 
specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due 
process.”  United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 
(1997); see also Betts, 621 F.3d at 261.  The District Court 
held that because the Third Circuit addresses over-detention 
under the rubric of the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiffs could 
not bring parallel claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
protection of substantive due process.   
 Appellants and amicus argue that the more-specific-
provision rule does not apply to all claims, because some 
plaintiffs were pretrial detainees, who are not protected by the 
Eighth Amendment.14  Our Court has always analyzed over-
                                                 
14 They also argue that Plaintiffs’ claims arose under a 
procedural due process framework rather than a substantive 
due process framework.  This argument is waived.  Plaintiffs’ 
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detention claims under the Eighth Amendment, unlike some 
other courts.  See Barnes, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 274-75 
(“Overdetentions potentially violate the substantive 
component of the Due Process Clause. . . .”).  But we have 
applied the Eighth Amendment because each of our over-
detention cases involved convicted and sentenced inmates.  
Montanez, 603 F.3d 243; Moore, 986 F.2d 682; Sample, 885 
F.2d 1099.   
 Our precedent is clear that while the detention of 
sentenced inmates is governed by the Eighth Amendment, the 
treatment of pretrial detainees is governed by the Due Process 
Clause.  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979) (“Due 
process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished. A 
sentenced inmate, on the other hand, may be punished, 
although that punishment may not be ‘cruel and unusual’ 
under the Eighth Amendment.”); Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 
F.2d 468, 471 (3d Cir. 1987) (“Pretrial detainees are not 
within the ambit of the Eighth Amendment but are entitled to 
the protections of the Due Process clause.”); Hubbard v. 
Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 164-67 (3d Cir. 2005) (same).   
 For pretrial detainees, therefore, there is no applicable 
provision more specific than the Due Process Clause and the 
more-specific-provision rule does not apply.  A separate due 
process analysis is required.   
 The protections of the Eighth Amendment and Due 
Process Clauses are sometimes, but not always, the same.  
Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 164-67.  We need not delve into the 
                                                                                                             
arguments below expressly identified their claims as being for 
substantive due process. 
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differences between those two analyses in this context, 
however.  This is a suit against supervisory officials, for the 
creation of policies and practices.  Supervisory policy-and-
practice liability requires deliberate indifference.  A.M. ex rel. 
J.M.K., 372 F.3d at 586.  Thus, for the same reasons as in our 
Eighth Amendment analysis, we conclude that there is no 
genuine dispute of material fact as to deliberate indifference 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  We will affirm.15 
                                                 
15 Having affirmed the District Court’s grants of summary 
judgment on the merits, we need not reach the other issues in 
the Court’s opinion: qualified immunity, sovereign immunity, 
and class certification.  We also need not reach the causation 
prong of the Eighth Amendment analysis.   
